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THE ATTRIBUTIONAL "DOUBLE STANDARD": 
ACTOR-OBSERVER DIFFERENCES IN PREDICTING THE 
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ATTITUDES AND BEHAVIORS' 
Barry R. Schlenker 
University of Florida 
Thom11 V. Bonoma 
University of Pittsburgh 
Donelson R. Forsyth 
University of Florida 
It was hypothesized that subjects who took the role of intnanion obsnvc-rs ratlwr than a<" 
tors would predic t a closer relationship b e tween a ttitudc.•s a nd l><·haviors and would report 
greater confidence in behavio ral predic tions d e rivable from an anor's attitu~k statc·1~c-1m . 
One hundred sixty-eight subjects assumed the role of e ither actor or ohs<·n ·n in sn·nanos of 
group interaction s in which a central pe rson made a statemt•nt about a parti<·ular allituck ob· 
ject. As predicted , subjects in the observer ro le reportrd that sprcifir futurr lwha\·iorli lt•.g . . 
loaning money, helping to study for a test) had a greater likelihood of tK«Urrt·m·r following an 
attitude statement (e.g., "I like Pat') than did subjects in th<> actor rolr. and ohsrrwr~ wrrr 
more confident than actors in these prediction s. In additio n . th<> favorability of the attitudr 
statement was directly rel a ted to the strength of predictions. and the central person's 
familiarity with the audience was direc tly r ela ted to confidence in prt>diniom,. Obser"·ers ap· 
parently view attitude statements as reliable indications of internal dispositions that serve as a 
potential "cause" of subsequent behavio rs , while ac tors view attitude statements as tenuous 
orientations that can be modified in a ccord with future situational contingencies. 
Jones and Nisbett (1971) proposed that actors are disposed to locate the 
cause of their behavior in the environment , while observers attribute the 
same behavior to stable traits possessed by the actor. In explanation, Jones 
and Nisbett hypothesized that these divergent attributions could be the 
result of (a) differences in access to knowledge of past behavior and inter-
nal states, since actors should be more aware of their own inconsistencies 
across situations and the compelling pressures of environmental influences: 
(b) perceptual information processing, since the focus of attention for tht 
actor may be on the environment while for the observer it may be on the 
acto_r's behavior; and (c) self-esteem protection, since actors may be 
motivated to attribute the cause of undesirable behaviors to the environ· 
ment rather than the self. 
1The present pape r was partia lly supported by the Organizational Effectiveness Rcst"arch 
Program, Office of N aval Research (Code 4~2) , under Contract No . N000\4- 7$-C-0901 : NR 
170-797 , to the first author, and grants from the Marketing Science Institute and Nat~onal 
Science Foundation to the second author. Data analyses were supported by the Universny of 
Florida Computing Sciences Center. Requests for reprints should be sent to Barry R. 
Schlenker, Department of Psychology. University of Florida. Gainesville . Florida 32611. 
108 
The supporting evidence cited by Jones and Nisbett Qones & Harris, 
1967: Jones, Rock, Shaver, Goethals, & Ward, 1968; McArthur, 1972 ; 
Nisbett. Caputo, Legant, & Maracek, 1973) has been buttressed by more 
reccm investigations which have attempted to define the necessary and suf-
ficiem conditions under which the actor-observer divergence may occur. 
For example. Storms ( 1973) used videotapes of "get acquainted" conversa-
tions which were playc•d hack to actors and matched observers. The typical 
actor-observer diffrrences were obtained when subjects were shown a tape 
of rhc pcrspcnivc rhcy had already witnessed. These differences were 
n·n·rsed , however . when subjects were shown a tape of the opposite 
pt·rsp<'nivc (i.e .. observers viewed a tape from the actor's perspective while 
anors vicw<'d a rape of the observer's perspective). 
This reversal of the actor-observn difference has been replicated in 
st'\Tral otlwr studi<•s (e.g .. Arkin & Duval, 1975; Miller, 1975 , Experiment 4; 
Taylor & Fiske. 1975) . [n general, the research tends to support the con-
dusion that tlw divcrgcnc.·c is in large part due to the different perspectives 
of tht· individuals in the situation. However , Regan and Totten (1975) 
point out that studiC's such as Storms (1973) and Taylor and Fiske ( 1975) 
arc confounded since' the perspective shift must naturally include an objec-
t iv<· information increase as well . In the process of shifting the observers' 
frKus of att<·ntion to the situation and the actors' focus to themselves, the 
manipulation gave subjects additional environmental and personal infor-
mation that was not formerly available . 
Regan and Totten attempted to alleviate this problem by manipulating 
hoth pnspt>nive shift and information increase, again through the use of 
vidc•otaped "get acquainted" sessions. Observers were given either standard 
ohs<'rver instructions or an empathic set modeled after Stotland's (I 969) 
"imagine him" directions. Their results indicated that the attributions of 
empathic observers were more situational and less dispositional than the 
attributions of nonempathic observers , supporting the hypothesis that a 
perceptual focus of attention largely determines attributions. This 
r<'s<·a rch is complemented by a study performed by Duval and Wicklund 
( 1973). who found that objectively self-aware actors' (self-focused) attribu-
tions were relatively less situational and more dispositional than the at-
tributions made by subjectively self-aware actors (situation -focused) . 
These' results suggest that for both actors and observers, the perspective 
(focus of attention) one assumes is sufficient to determine whether attribu-
tions arc made lo the actor or the environment. But unless som<>thing is 
done w alter one's characteristic focus of attention (e.g., inducing objec-
tive self-awareness. employing empathy instructions) , actors attend to 
situational aspects while observers attend to the actor's dispositions. 
Interestingly. the perspective hypothesis could indirectly bear on the 
long-standing controversy of whether and/ or when a person's attitudes will 
affect subsequent behavior (e.g., Bern, 1972; Festinger, 1964; LaPiere, 
I 934: Wicker, I 969) . It has been argued both that attitudes are largely ir-
relC'vant to the prediction of situation-specific behaviors and that attitudes 
are important , though not the only, causes of behaviors (e.g., Fishbein & 
Ajzen, I 975: Snyder & Swann , 1975). Correlations between attitudes and 
behaviors are generally small, but often significant, across a variety of 
situations and studies, lending some degree of empirical support to both 
positions and no critical verdict for either. The perspective one takes in ex-
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cogitating about the issue could play more than a minor role in how on<-
describes the attitude-behavior relationship. The perspective hypothesis 
implies that ( l) actors characteristically hold a more t<'nuous view of rht· 
relationship of their cognitive structures to possible actions than do 
observers, and (2) a kind of attributional " double standard" may be in ef. 
feet, where actors are willing to " discount" the certainty of their own 
attitude-behavior links , but fail to make the same discount wlwn in rhe 
role of observing another. Actors, typically focused on the t•rwironmem. 
should tend to view their own attitude statements as only tentati\'t· ori<'nta · 
tions toward the world, orientations which mzght be implemenrcd if "all 
other things were equal" or "nothing came up ," but definitely not as in · 
variant internal indicators of disposition which (·ause any specific bd1avior 
as a necessary and sufficient condition. Attitude-reh·vant futur<' behaviors 
would be seen by the actor as highly affected by future situational <·on · 
tingencies . Obse rvers , typically focused on the actor. should p<-rform no 
such situational discounting, but should view an actor's au it ud<'slat<·mrnts as 
at least partial evidence of an internal disposition that will <·aus<' subs<" 
quent behaviors consistent with the statement to occur. Thus. following an 
attitude statement such as " I like John ," observers should predict that thr 
actor would be willing to loan John money, want to go to th<' movi<"s with 
him , help him to study for tests , and so on, and have high confidence in 
the accuracy of their predictions. Actors should int<'rpr<'t th<' statement 
differently; they should feel that these specific behaviors arc not as likely to 
occur, since they would depend upon the future situation, and would hav<' 
less confidence in whatever predictions they do make. Although several 
studies have examined the relationship between dispositional trait auribu· 
tions and predictions of future behaviors (e.g., Gurwitz & Panciera, 1975; 
Langer & Roth, 1975; Miller, 1975; Nisbett, et al., 1973; Snyder & 
Frankel, 1976), the present study tested the generality of an attributional 
double standard as a judgmental bias under predictive attitude-behavior 
conditions. 
Subjects read scenarios d escribing an interaction among several people. 
The central person in each made a statement about an attitude object, and 
subjects were asked (a) to predict the likelihood that the central person 
would respond in specific ways toward the object and (b) to indicate their 
confidence in their predictions. The major independent variable 
manipulation was the role that subjects were asked to assume. Half were 
given standard observer instructions, while the remainder were told to im-
ag£ne yourself actually sayz"ng and doz"ng the things being attributed to you. 
The latter actor instructions seem to go beyond standard manipulations of 
empathy which simply ask subjects to evaluate the situation from the 
perspective of another person. It was hypothesized that subjects who 
assumed the role of the central person (actors) would predict a smaller 
likelihood of occurrence of the specific behaviors and would have less con-
fidence in their predictions than would subjects who assumed the role of 
observers . If such effects occur under conditions where actors and 
observers are given identical objective information and where the 
described behaviors are not undesirable, it would provide strong support 
for the conclusion that neither self-esteem protection nor differential ac· 
cess to objective information are necessary for the occurrence of actor-
observer differences (possible subjective differences in these factors will be 
discussed later) . 110 
Additionally , the scenarios contained variations in the favorability of the 
atticude statement (e .g ., "I like John" versus "I like John more than anyone 
else") and in the familiarity of the other group members to the central per-
son. Both statement favorability and audience familiarity were 
hypothesized to increase the strength and confidence of behavioral predic-
tions. People should learn to associate highly favorable statements with 
greater commitment toward the attitude object; people typically do not 
praise something unless they are committed in some way to it. Thus, the 
more favorable the attitude statement, the more it should be seen as an im-
portant personal disposition that should affect behavior. Audience 
familiarity .should also be an important context variable. When interacting 
with unfamiliar others, attitude statements could serve more of an impres-
sion management function than an expressive function , and hence be seen 
as less revealing of one's " true" feelings. The statement might be seen 
merdy as a way of currying favor with the unfamiliar audience or fitting in 
with the group. Thus, audience familiarity should affect the amount of 
perceived external pressure placed on the central person to make a par-
ticular statement. People should infer that the attitude statement is more 
rt"flective of underlying attitude strength when external pressure is low 
(familiar audience) rather than high (unfamiliar audience) (Bern, 1972). 
Further. attitude statements are more committing when they are made 
before friends rather than casual acquaintances. People should expect 
continued interaction with and monitoring by friends , and therefore say 
only what they really mean . Lastly, subjects responded to two different 
scenarios, one involving statements made about another person and one 
involving statements made about a political party. Though speculations 
could be advanced about possible effects of a personal versus extrapersonal 
attitude object, no specific predictions were made. The different scenarios 
were included to assess generalizability of the results. 
Method 
Subjects 
One hundred and sixty-eight male and female introductory psychology 
students. 21 per cell of the four-factor mixed-design, participated to par-
tially fulfill a course requirement . 
Procedure 
Subjects were run in groups, with booklets from different conditions 
randomly distributed within each group. To increase the generality of the 
interpretation, each booklet contained two short scenarios about different 
kinds of attitude objects. One referred to a central actor making a state-
ment about another person (personal attitude object) and the other 
referred to a central actor making a statement about a political party (ex-
trapersonal attitude object). The instructions for each booklet emphasized 
that subjects were to imagine either that they were the central person or 
that they were observing the central person. Within each scenario, the 
statement made by the central person expressed either moderate or high 
favorability to the attitude object and was made before a group of people 
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who were either well-known or little known. Hence, the design contained 
three between-subjects factors- respondent perspective (actor vs. 
observer), attitude favorability (high vs. moderate), and audience 
familiarity (high vs. low)-and·one within-subjects factor - attitude object 
(personal vs. extrapersonal). Subjects were asked to carefully read the writ · 
ten instructions and proceed as directed, answering questions about each 
scenario that appeared in the booklet. When finished, subjects were 
thanked for their participation and permitted to leave. 
Materials 
The two short scenarios briefly described an interaction among several 
people, one of whom made an attitude-relevant statement. In the 
personal-attitude-object scenario, a group was said to be discussing people 
whom they all know, and the name "Pat" popped up in the conversation. 
(Pat and the central person were described to be of the subject's own sex. 
and Pat was said not to be present during the discussion group). The cen· 
tral person then expressed a favorable attitude toward Pat. In the 
extrapersonal-attitude-object scenario, the topic of "politics and political 
parties" was brought up in the group, and a discussion began. The central 
person then expressed a favorable attitude toward "party X." All subjects 
received both scenarios, with the order of presentation counterbalanced. 
In the actor condition, the written instructions that preceded the two 
scenarios asked subjects to "imagine that you are in the group being 
described. Imagine that you actually are talking and listening to what is 
being said" and "that you are saying what is being attributed to you." The 
scenarios employed the word "you" throughout , and emphasized that 
"you" made the statements that concerned Pat and party X . In the 
observer condition, the written instructions asked subjects to "imagine that 
you are observing the group being described but are not participating in 
the discussion." The central person was designated by initials, e.g. , T.N .. 
thus allowing the actor and observer scenarios to be identical except for the 
substitution of phrases such as "T.N. makes the following statement" or 
"you make the following statement." 
Familiarity of the audience was varied by either stating that individuals 
in the group knew one another very well (high familiarity) or that the 
group members were merely acquaintances who had gotten together for 
one of the first times (low familiarity). Favorability toward the attitude ob-
ject was varied by the appropriate use of modifiers. For example, when 
discussing Pat, moderate favorability actors stated, "I like Pat. We have a 
fairly good time when we're together. Pat is one of the nicer people I 
know." High favorability actors, on the other hand, stated, "I really like 
Pat.,very much. We have a great time whenever we're together. Pat is one 
of the greatest people I know." 
The following example was the scenario used for the actor/high-
familiarity I moderate-£ avorability I extrapersonal-attitude-object condi· 
tion: 
During lunch one day, you are talking with several friends and ~c­
quaintances. You know these people very well. At one point dunng 
the conversation one of the people in the group brings up the topic of 
politics and political parties, and a discussion begins. During the 
.ll~ 
conversation, you make the following statement: "I've been a 
member of party X for some time now. I've tried to examine all the 
issues carefully, and I firmly believe that the positions the party takes 
are in the best interests of the country. I've given the party my 
wholehearted support in the past and I'll definitely continue to do so 
in the future." 
Dependent Variables 
Each scenario was followed by nine questions. Two of the items were 
checks on the familiarity and commitment manipulations. Six of the items 
asked subjects to make specific predictions concerning future behaviors 
that could be related to the attitude object. For example, when the at-
titude object was personal, subjects were asked questions such as "How 
likely would you (T.N.) be to give time to help Pat study for a test?" and 
'"How willing would you (T.N.) be to loan Pat money?" When the attitude 
object was extrapersonal, subjects were asked questions such as "How likely 
is it that you (T.N.) would contribute time for door-to-door campaigning 
on behalf of party X during the next elecction?" and "How likely is it that 
you (T.N.) would make a monetary contribution to party X during the 
next election?" Wherever possible, as in the above, items were equated in 
asking for time, money, etc. Other items asked for the likelihood of such 
occurrences as having a change of opinion or saying something negative 
about the attitude object. Finally, subjects were asked how confident they 
were of the correctness of their answers. Each of the nine items was 
followed by a 3 7 -point scale marked with 7 verbal labels ranging from "not 
at all" to "extremely." 
Results 
Manipulation Checks 
Both the familiarity and favorability manipulations were successful. 
Subjects in the high-familiarity condition (M = 22. 7) felt that the group 
members liked one another more, F{l , 160)= 50.193, p <.01, than did 
subjects in the low-familiarity condition (M= 17.4). Subjects in the high· 
favorability condition (M = 29.6) felt that the central person was m;,re 
favorable toward the attitude object, F{l ,160)= 34.780, p<.Ol, than did 
subjects in the moderate-favorability conditions (M= 25.6). 
Predictions of Future Behavior 
A four-factor, repeated measures analysis of variance was performed on 
the sum of subjects' responses to the six behavior predictions that followed 
each scenario. Main effects of both perspective, F(l, 160) = 5.349, p <.05, 
and favorability , F(I, 160) = 8.037, p <.01, were obtained. Supporting the 
major hypothesis , subjects believed that the central person was more likely 
to engage in attitude-relevant behaviors when they were in the role of 
observers rather than actors; means were 151.5 and 142.9, respectively. 
The favorability main effect indicated that subjects who had read the 
high-favorability statements believed that the attitude.•relevant behaviors 
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were more likely to occur than subjects who had read moderare· 
favorability statements; means were 152.4 and 141.9, respe(·tivdy. No 
other significant effects were obtained on the summed behavioral 
predictions. 
Confidence in Predictions 
Analysis of subjects' responses to the question. "How confident an· you 
of your answers to the above questions?" (the item followed thr- six 
behavioral prediction measures) revealed main effects due to pcnpt'Clivt', 
F(l , 160) = 12 .191, p < .01 , and group familiarity. F( 1.160) = 4.285. 
p < .05, and a three-way interaction between favorability . perspective. and 
attitude object, F(l, 160) = 4 .552, p <.05. As predicted , subjects who 
assumed the role of actors were less confident of their predictioru than sub· 
jects who assumed the role of observers; means were 23.2 and 26 .5. rt"Sp«· 
tively. Additionally, subjects were less confident of their attributions wht'n 
there was low-familiarity of the group members than when there was high· 
familiarity; means were 23.9 and 25.8, respectively. 
Means for the three-way interaction are presented in Table 1. Ob~rver· 
subjects were highly confident of their predictions irrespective of tht 
degree of favorability expressed or the attitude object being described by 
the statement. The confidence of actor-subjects, on the other hand, was 
affected by both favorability and the attitude object, with actor-subjects 
expressing more confidence under high rather than moderate·favorability 
when the attitude object was personal; t(160) = 1.99, p < .05 (two-tailed). 
Attitude Object 
Personal 
Extra personal 
TABLEl 
Mean Ratings of Confidence 
in Attributions 
Condition 
Actor Role 0 bserver Role 
Moderate High Moderate High 
Favor· Favor- Favor· Favor· 
ability ability ability ability 
21.8 25.0 26.6 26.2 
23 .8 22 .3 26.7 26.5 
Discussz"on 
The results clearly supported the major hypotheses that (a) observers are 
more willing than actors to assume that specific behaviors follow from an 
attitude statement, and (b) observers have greater confidence than actors 
in predictions that are made about behaviors. Observers were apparently 
more wiJling to assume that an attitude statement reflects an underlying 
disposition that affects future behaviors , while actors apparently viewed 
the attitude statements more as an orientation toward the attitude object 
than as an inflexible linkage with the attitude object. There is thus some 
justification for asserting that some attributional "double standard" 
operates with generality not only in postdictive estimations of the attitude-
behavior relationship . but also in predictive forecasts of the strength of this 
relationship. 
The attitude-favorability and audience-familiarity manipulations pro· 
duced effects that were generally consistent with the hypotheses. 
Favorability was directly related to subjects' behavioral predic-
tions · - highly favorable attitude statements were seen as more likely to lead 
to specific behaviors than were less favorable statements. However, predic-
tive confidence was affected by the interaction of favorability, perspective, 
and auitude object. Favorability did not affect observers' confidence 
ratings. and only affected actors' confidence ratings toward the personal 
attitude object. Perhaps an extreme statement about another person, as 
opposf'd to an extrapersonal object, produces greater perceived social 
pressure to live up to the statement's behavioral implications. Such an ex-
treme personal statement might even be perceived by the actor as a sort of 
promise which must be fulfilled. Thus, actors' confidence ratings increase 
for whatever behavioral implications seem to follow an extreme personal 
statement. 
Audience familiarity affected confidence in the hypothesized direction , 
with high familiarity producing greater confidence than low familiarity. 
However, familiarity did not affect behavioral predictions. Apparently, 
the favorability of an attitude statement primarily serves to delineate the 
behaviors which should follow from it, while the context of the situation 
(familiarity) only affects one's confidence in making these predictions. 
Why such a separation occurred between behavioral implications and con· 
fidence is unclear . Perhaps the specificity is due to the logical ramifications 
of the variables. People may first decide what behavioral implications ex-
ist; the more extreme the statement, the greater the implications. When 
they evaluate their confidence, though, they look to situational pressures 
which may have constrained the statement, e .g ., was it made to friends or 
strangers? The fact that subjects rated the implications first and then their 
predictive confidence might have reinforced such a two-step process. 
Future research will be needed to explore the specificity effect. 
The procedure used in the present experiment was successful in 
producing actor-observer differences despite the control of both objective 
information and motivation. Several possible explanations exist for these 
differences. The first, a derivative of the different-histories hypothesis 
Qones & Nisbett, 1971), suggests that actors may have compared the 
descriptions of the central character with their own recalled past 
behaviors. The comparison may have led them to conclude that the 
depicted attitude statements were atypical of their own, so that any future 
behavior would be less likely to be linked to them . Given the nature of the 
attitude statements which were used, this seems unlikely; it would be rare 
to find a college student who has not made comparable statements at one 
or another tim~ . Or, the actors may have recalled comparable personal 
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statements and remembered that few behaviors followed. However, if few 
behavioral implications actually do follow all actors' attitude statements, 
why would observers predict more such effects and have higher confidence 
in their ratings? Observers should be equally able to recall that people do 
not follow their words with deeds. However, it is impossible to rule out ex· 
planations based on such privately conjured information or motivation 
differences. 
The overall pattern of results would seem to provide strong support for 
the perspective hypothesis. Causes of behaviors are attributed to the most 
salient element of the perceptual field (Duval & Wicklund, 1973; Pryor & 
Kriss, 1977; Wegner & Finstuen, 1977). Actors typically focus on the en· 
vironment, obtaining adaptive information useful in planning behavioral 
contingencies. Observers typically focus on the actor, obtaining adaptive 
information that is useful in understanding and predicting what the actor 
will do. Such functional differences in focus allow people to best fulfill 
their goals in social situations. 
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